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Abstract
Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of
explanation, and ontological levels. This paper presents a framework for studying
levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and discuss several appli-
cations, some of which refer to descriptive or explanatory levels while others refer
to ontological levels. I illustrate the usefulness of this framework by bringing it to
bear on some familiar philosophical questions. Is there a hierarchy of levels, with a
fundamental level at the bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply
for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? Are there
emergent higher-level properties? Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-
level ones? Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be
viewed as one involving levels? And might a levelled framework shed light on the
relationship between third-personal and first-personal phenomena?
1 Introduction
Scientists as well as philosophers frequently employ notions such as levels of description,
levels of explanation, and ontological levels. Although it is widely held – though by no
means universally accepted – that everything in the world is the product of fundamental
physical processes, it is also widely recognized that, for many scientific purposes, the right
∗This paper articulates a framework that has been implicit – to variable extents – in several of my
previous works, but has never been spelt out in full. Relevant works include List and Menzies (2009,
2010), List and Pettit (2011), List and Spiekermann (2013), List (2014), List and Pivato (2015a,b), and
Dietrich and List (2016, Section 8). I wish to record my intellectual debt to all of my co-authors of these
works: the late Peter Menzies, Philip Pettit, Kai Spiekermann, Marcus Pivato, and Franz Dietrich. I am
also grateful to Marcus Pivato for detailed comments on a draft of this paper, and to Richard Bradley,
Elizabeth Coppock, Johannes Himmelreich, George Musser, Wlodek Rabinowicz, and Laura Valentini
for helpful discussions. My work was supported by a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship.
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level of description or explanation is not the fundamental physical one, but a “higher”
level, which abstracts away from microphysical details.1 Chemistry, biology, geology, and
meteorology would all get bogged down with an informational or computational overload
if they tried to explain the phenomena in their domains by modelling the behaviour of
every elementary particle, instead of invoking “higher-level” properties and regularities.
For instance, it would be a hopeless task to try to understand a biological organism or
an ecosystem at the level of the billions of elementary particles of which it is composed,
rather than at the macroscopic level of its biological functioning.
Similarly, cognitive scientists tend to assume that human psychology is better un-
derstood at the level of the mind (the cognitive-psychological level) than at the level
of the brain (the neuro-physiological level).2 This parallels the observation that it is
much easier to understand the workings of a word-processing package such as Microsoft
Word at the software level than at the hardware level, where astronomical numbers of
electrons flow through microchips.
Finally, for many social-scientific purposes, the right level of description is not the
“micro”-level of individuals, but a social level, involving “macro”-variables.3 Despite the
popularity of methodological individualism – the view that social phenomena should be
explained at the level of individuals – macro-economists and political scientists would
have a hard time modelling the economy or the dynamics of political systems if they
tried to represent the behaviour of every single market participant or every single citizen.
Given the ubiquity of higher-level descriptions in science, some philosophers ask
whether the world itself might be “stratified into levels”, where different levels are or-
ganized hierarchically, perhaps with a fundamental level at the bottom.4 The levels in
question, then, are not just levels of description or explanation, but levels of reality or
ontological levels. On one view, different descriptive or explanatory levels correspond to
different ontological levels: they are “epistemic markers” of something “ontic”.
How should we think about levels? Are notions such as levels of description, levels
of explanation, or ontological levels mere metaphors, as is sometimes suggested, or can
we explicate them precisely? The aim of this paper is to present a general framework for
studying levels, whether interpreted epistemically or ontically. I introduce an abstract
definition of a system of levels and discuss a number of applications, some of which
can be interpreted as capturing descriptive or explanatory levels while others can be
interpreted as capturing ontological levels. One of these applications captures the idea
1See, among many others, Fodor (1974), Owens (1989), and Beckermann, Flohr, and Kim (1992).
2For a classic discussion, see Putnam (1967). On levels in cognitive science, see also Bechtel (1994).
3See, e.g., Kincaid (1986), Sawyer (2002, 2003), List and Pettit (2011), and List and Spiekermann (2013).
4For a defence of the stratified picture, see Schaffer (2003). The quote (de-italicized) is from p. 498.
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that a level of description may be a marker of an ontological level. The applications build
on some recent discussions of levels in the literature; the underlying abstract definition
is inspired by category theory.5
I will illustrate the usefulness of the proposed framework by bringing it to bear
on some familiar philosophical questions: are levels linearly ordered, and is there a
fundamental level?6 And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism,
the thesis that everything supervenes on (i.e., is determined by) the physical? Are
there emergent higher-level properties that are not accompanied by matching lower-
level properties? Are higher-level descriptions always reducible to lower-level ones? Can
we represent the relationship between normative and non-normative domains as one
involving levels? And might a levelled framework shed some light on the relationship
between third-personal and first-personal levels, especially on the (often claimed) failure
of the first-personal to supervene on the third-personal?7 My aim is not to give conclusive
answers to these questions. It would be preposterous to try to do so within the scope of
a single paper. My aim is rather to illustrate how the proposed framework allows us to
frame some of the issues in a helpful way.
2 A system of levels: an abstract definition
I begin by giving an abstract definition of a system of levels. In the next section, I
discuss some instances of this definition. In some cases, the idea of levels has a more
epistemological or explanatory flavour, in others a more ontological one.
A system of levels is a pair 〈L,S〉, defined as follows:
• L is a class of objects called levels (which will be given more structure later), and
• S is a class of mappings between levels, called supervenience mappings, where each
such mapping σ has a source level L and a target level L′ and is denoted σ : L  L′,
such that the following conditions hold:
5The closest precursors to the present work are Butterfield (2012), List (2014), and List and Pivato
(2015a,b). Himmelreich (2015, Appendix B) also explicates the idea of levels, building on the formal-
ism in List and Pivato (2015a). Category theory goes back to Eilenberg and MacLane (1945). For a
philosophical survey, see Marquis (2015). For a recent philosophy-of-science application (specifically, an
account of theories as categories), see Halvorson (forthcoming). Category theory has also been suggested
as a framework for thinking about levels of description in cognitive and brain science (Go´mez Ramirez
2014). However, my proposal here is quite different from those earlier works in the literature.
6This is the question discussed in Schaffer (2003).
7For arguments against the supervenience of first-personal consciousness on third-personal physical
properties, see, e.g., Chalmers (1996, 2004). For an earlier classic contribution, see Nagel (1974).
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(S1) S is closed under composition of mappings, i.e., if S contains σ : L  L′ and
σ′ : L′  L′′, then it also contains the composite mapping σ • σ′ : L  L′′ defined
by first applying σ and then applying σ′ (where composition is associative8);
(S2) for each level L, there is an identity mapping 1L : L  L in S, such that, for every
mapping σ : L  L′, we have 1L • σ = σ = σ • 1L′ ;
(S3) for any pair of levels L and L′, there is at most one mapping from L to L′ in S.
Interpretationally, when the mapping σ : L  L′ is contained in S, this means that level
L′ supervenes (or depends) on level L. We then call L′ the supervenient (or higher) level
and L the subvenient (or lower) level, according to σ. Alternatively, we might call σ
a determination mapping. In philosophy, supervenience is understood as a relation of
determination or necessation. One set of facts is said to “supervene” on a second set if the
second set of facts determines the first, i.e., a change in the first set of facts is impossible
without any change in the second. There can be different notions of supervenience,
corresponding to different modes of determination or necessitation; supervenience can
be metaphysical or nomological, for example.9 The formal framework is compatible with
different interpretations.
The three conditions on a system of levels capture some familiar properties of the
notion of supervenience. Condition (S1) entails that supervenience is transitive: if L′′
supervenes on L′, and L′ supervenes on L, then L′′ also supervenes on L. Condition
(S2) entails that every level supervenes on itself; trivially, supervenience is reflexive
(though nothing of substance hangs on this). Condition (S3) entails that, whenever L′
supervenes on L, the relation in which L and L′ stand is unique; this is in line with
the idea of supervenience as a relation of determination or necessitation. The three
conditions jointly entail a fourth condition:
(S4) if S contains a mapping σ : L  L′ and a mapping σ′ : L′  L, then σ • σ′ = 1L.10
Informally, if two levels supervene on one another (which might perhaps never happen if
8Formally, σ • (σ′ • σ′′) = (σ • σ′) • σ′′ whenever σ : L  L′, σ′ : L′  L′′, and σ′′ : L′′  L′′′.
9One set of facts supervenes metaphysically on a second if a change in the first set of facts is meta-
physically impossible without a change in the second. One set of facts supervenes nomologically on a
second if this is nomologically impossible, i.e., impossible relative to the appropriate laws of nature.
10To see this, suppose that S contains a mapping σ : L  L′ and a mapping σ′ : L′  L. By (S1), S
will then also contain the composite mapping σ • σ′ : L  L. By (S2), S contains an identity mapping
1L : L  L for level L. By (S3), S contains at most one mapping from L to L. Since both σ • σ′ and
1L are mappings from L to L, they must coincide; otherwise S would contain more than one mapping
from L to L. This establishes (S4).
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these levels are distinct), then the composite of the relations in which they stand must
be the identity relation.
In algebraic terms, the pair 〈L,S〉, subject to conditions (S1) and (S2), is a structure
called a “category”. Generally, a category is a pair consisting of a class of objects and
a class of mappings betweens objects, often called “arrows” or “morphisms”, where
conditions (S1) and (S2) hold. In the present context, the “objects” are levels, and
the “arrows” or “morphisms” are supervenience mappings. Categories that also satisfy
condition (S3), as in the case of 〈L,S〉, are called “posetal categories”.
The category-theoretic way of representing systems of levels allows us to identify
structural relationships between different such systems.11 First of all, one system of
levels, 〈L,S〉, is a subsystem of another, 〈L′,S ′〉, if
• L ⊆ L′ and S ⊆ S ′, and
• composition and identity in 〈L,S〉 are defined as in 〈L′,S ′〉.12
Second, and more generally, there can be structure-preserving mappings between differ-
ent systems of levels. These are called functors. A functor, F , from one system of levels,
〈L,S〉, to another, 〈L′,S ′〉, is a mapping which
• assigns to each level L in L a corresponding level L′ = F (L) in L′, and
• assigns to each supervenience mapping σ : L  L′ in S a corresponding superve-
nience mapping σ′ = F (σ) in S ′, where σ′ : F (L) F (L′),
such that F preserves composition and identity.13 The existence of a functor from one
system of levels to another means that we can map the first system into the second in a
way that preserves supervenience relationships. If there are functors in both directions
(e.g., from 〈L,S〉 to 〈L′,S ′〉 and from 〈L′,S ′〉 to 〈L,S〉), where these functors are inverses
of one another, this indicates that the two systems of levels are structurally equivalent.
The attraction of the present definition of a system of levels is its generality, as I will
now illustrate.
11Note that, under Go´mez Ramirez’s (2014) very different proposal, each level – as opposed to a
system of levels – is represented by a category (e.g., the category of neurons for the neuronal level, with
synaptic paths playing the role of morphisms), and there are no supervenience mappings as morphisms.
12Note that 〈L,S〉 and 〈L′,S ′〉, qua systems of levels, must each satisfy (S1) to (S3).
13Formally, for any two supervenience mappings σ and σ′ in S, where the target level of σ coincides
with the source level of σ′, we have F (σ • σ′) = F (σ) • F (σ′); and for any identity mapping 1L in S, we
have F (1L) = 1F (L), where 1F (L) is the identity mapping in S ′ for level F (L).
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3 Four instances of systems of levels
I will discuss four applications of the general definition I have given. Some of these refer
explicitly to levels of description, others refer explicitly to ontological levels, and in some
cases they admit both interpretations.
3.1 Levels of grain
I begin with a very simple example of a system of levels, which is generated by different
ways of partitioning an underlying non-empty set Ω of possible worlds (or other items).14
Consider an equivalence relation ∼ on Ω (a reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive rela-
tion). Any such relation ∼ partitions Ω into some non-empty, pairwise disjoint, and
jointly exhaustive equivalence classes (each of which consists of worlds or items that are
equivalent with respect to ∼). Let Ω∼ denote the resulting set of equivalence classes.
We call Ω∼ a partition of Ω. We obtain the finest partition if ∼ is the identity relation;
here, each element of Ω forms a singleton equivalence class by itself. We obtain the
coarsest partition if ∼ is the total relation, under which all elements of Ω fall into the
same equivalence class. Non-trivial partitions lie in between these two extremes.
For any two partitions Ω∼ and Ω≈, we say that Ω∼ is at least as fine-grained as Ω≈
if each equivalence class in Ω≈ is a union of equivalence classes in Ω∼. The relation “at
least as fine-grained as” partially orders partitions. Whenever Ω∼ is at least as fine-
grained as Ω≈, we define a function σ : Ω∼  Ω≈ that assigns to each equivalence class
in Ω∼ the equivalence class in Ω≈ in which it is included.
It is easy to see that we get a system of levels if we define the pair 〈L,S〉 as follows:
• L is some non-empty set of partitions of Ω, perhaps the set of all logically possible
partitions;
• S consists of every function σ : Ω∼  Ω≈ under the definition just given, where
Ω∼ and Ω≈ are elements of L such that Ω∼ is at least as fine-grained as Ω≈.
A level, here, is simply a particular way of partitioning the underlying space of possibil-
ities (worlds or items) into equivalence classes, such that we do not distinguish between
members of the same equivalence class. This definition captures what is meant by the
levels of grain at which we represent the world. The most natural interpretation of this
is an epistemic one. Different levels correspond to different ways of perceiving the world.
14The idea of identifying levels with partitions is discussed in Himmelreich (2015, Appendix B). Him-
melreich develops a version of this idea adapting the framework of worlds-as-histories from List and
Pivato (2015a).
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In decision theory, for example, an agent’s level of awareness is often modelled in this
way.15 Someone’s awareness is defined in terms the distinctions he or she is able to draw.
The agent is said to be aware of some feature of the world (or a feature of some item) if
and only if he or she is able to distinguish worlds (or items) with that feature from ones
without it. The more features an agent is aware of, the more distinctions between worlds
(or items) he or she is able to draw. Greater awareness thus corresponds to the adoption
of a more fine-grained partition of the space of possibilities, lesser awareness to the
adoption of a more coarse-grained partition. Accordingly, different levels of awareness
can be represented as a system of levels in the present sense.
3.2 Ontological levels
As already noted, it is a familiar idea – though still controversial – that the world itself
is stratified into levels.16 According to this levelled picture, there is not just a single
set of possible worlds (“possible worlds simpliciter”), but there are different such sets,
which encode facts at different levels. Worlds at the physical level encode the totality
of physical facts. Worlds at the chemical and biological levels encode the totality of
chemical and biological facts. And worlds at the psychological and social levels encode
the totality of psychological and social facts.
It is usually assumed that higher levels (which are “more macro”) supervene on lower
ones (which are “more micro”). For example, the chemical level supervenes on the phys-
ical one, insofar as the totality of physical facts determines the totality of chemical facts.
Furthermore, higher-level facts are usually assumed to be multiply realizable by lower-
level facts: different configurations of lower-level facts can correspond to (necessitate,
bring about, realize) the same higher-level facts. For instance, many different states of
the individual water molecules in a flask can instantiate the same aggregate macro-state
of the water. Similarly, a number of subtly different configurations of physical properties
can instantiate the same chemical or biological properties.
We can formalize this ontological picture as a system of levels 〈L,S〉, where:
• L is some non-empty class of sets of “level-specific” worlds (with each set of level-
specific worlds non-empty);
15See, e.g., Modica and Rustichini (1999). In a recent working paper, Dietrich (2016) has proposed a
model of decision-making under uncertainty in which an agent’s subjective conceptualization of outcomes
and states takes the form of appropriate partitions of some underlying space of possibilities.
16See, e.g., Schaffer (2003).
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• S is some class of surjective (“onto”) functions of the form σ : Ω  Ω′,17 where Ω
and Ω′ are elements of L, such that S satisfies (S1), (S2), and (S3).
Each element Ω of L can be interpreted as an ontological level : it is the set of possible
worlds at that level. For example, L might contain a set Ω corresponding to the physical
level, a set Ω′ corresponding to the chemical level, a set Ω′′ corresponding to the biological
level, and so on. A physical-level world settles all physical facts; a chemical-level world
settles all chemical facts; and so on.
To say that the chemical level supervenes on the physical, or that the biological
supervenes on the chemical, is to say that there exists a surjective function σ : Ω  Ω′,
which maps each lower-level world to the higher-level world that it realizes. Surjectivity
means that there are no possible worlds at the higher level that lack a lower-level realizer.
For example, for a world to be chemically possible – i.e., contained in Ω′ – it must have
a physical realizer: there must be some ω ∈ Ω such that σ(ω) = ω′. An instance of
multiple realizability occurs when the function σ : Ω  Ω′ is “many-to-one”: several
distinct elements of Ω can realize the same element of Ω′.18
We can use the present framework to express not only the idea that higher-level
worlds in Ω′ supervene on lower-level worlds in Ω, but also the idea that specific higher-
level facts supervene on specific lower-level facts. Let E′ ⊆ Ω′ represent some higher-level
fact, namely the fact that the higher-level world falls inside the set E′. We write σ−1(E′)
for the inverse image of E′ under the supervenience mapping σ, defined as the set of all
lower-level worlds that are mapped (by σ) to some element of E′, formally σ−1(E′) =
{ω ∈ Ω : σ(ω) ∈ E′}. We can then interpret E = σ−1(E′) as the supervenience base of
E′. It consists of all the possible lower-level realizers of E′. Whether the higher-level fact
E′ obtains (i.e., the higher-level world falls inside E′) depends on whether the underlying
lower-level fact E obtains (i.e., the lower-level world falls inside E). For instance, whether
someone is in pain (a psychological fact) supervenes on whether this person’s brain is in
a pain-generating state, such as “C-fibres firing” (a neuro-physiological fact).
The present understanding of ontological levels differs subtly from one that is com-
mon in the philosophical literature. Ontological levels are often understood as levels of
entities and their properties, where lower-level entities are the building blocks of higher-
level entities.19 The microphysical level, for example, is the level of elementary particles
and their properties, while the macrophysical level is the level of larger aggregates. The
17A function σ : Ω  Ω′ is surjective (“onto”) if, for every ω′ ∈ Ω′, there exists some ω ∈ Ω such that
σ(ω) = ω′.
18“Many-to-one” is the negation of injectivity. A function σ : Ω  Ω′ is injective (“one-to-one”) if, for
any ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, σ(ω) = σ(ω′) implies ω = ω′.
19See, e.g., Schaffer (2003) and Kim (1993); I quote Kim in Section 4.1 below.
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relationship between levels is then a part-whole relationship.20 Of course, level-specific
worlds as I have defined them here can be understood as specifications of level-specific
entities and their properties. Nonetheless, I think it is best to define levels primarily in
terms of level-specific worlds, and to take level-specific entities only to be derivative. So,
I prefer to begin with a specification of level-specific sets of worlds, and to treat these
only secondarily as specifications of the properties of certain level-specific entities. This
picture, which gives primacy to worlds rather than entities, is in line with Wittgenstein’s
famous dictum:
“The world is everything that is the case. The world is the totality of facts,
not of things.”21
In a similar vein, we may say: a level-specific world is everything that is the case at that
level; it is the totality of level-specific facts, not of level-specific things. Of course, if we
have a theory of the world at a particular level, where this theory has certain ontological
commitments, then we may interpret the entities and properties to which the theory is
committed as the level-specific entities and properties.
Finally, note that the levels of grain that I defined in the previous subsection can be
formally viewed as a special case of the present definition of ontological levels, although
the suggested interpretation of levels of grain was epistemological. If, in the earlier
definition, we interpret each coarsened partition of the underlying set Ω as a set of higher-
level worlds, then our earlier levels as partitions can be re-interpreted as ontological
levels, as defined in this subsection. Thus, for each system of levels of grain, there exists
a structurally equivalent system of ontological levels. (Recall that structural equivalence
means that there are functors, in both directions, between the two systems, where these
functors are inverses of each other.)
Importantly, the present definition of a system of ontological levels is more general
than the earlier definition of levels of grain. Under the present definition, higher-level
worlds need not be identified with equivalence classes of lower-level worlds; they merely
pick out such equivalence classes.22 The definition permits the inclusion in L of two
distinct levels Ω′ and Ω′′ which each supervene on some lower level Ω and pick out the
same equivalence classes of worlds in Ω. In fact, two distinct levels Ω′ and Ω′′ in L could
20Himmelreich (2015, Appendix B) also distinguishes between a mereological understanding of levels
and a world/state-based understanding akin to the one defended here and argues for the latter.
21See Wittgenstein (1922, 1 and 1.1).
22For any supervenience mapping σ : Ω  Ω′ in S, each world ω′ ∈ Ω′ picks out the equivalence class
of those worlds ω ∈ Ω such that σ(ω) = ω′.
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supervene on one another and could thus be viewed as distinct but isomorphic.23 By
contrast, if levels are partitions of some underlying set of worlds, no two distinct levels
of grain could ever supervene on one another.
Although a system of ontological levels is formally more general than a system of
levels of grain, there exists a functor from any system of ontological levels to some system
of levels of grain. That system will then mirror some (though not necessarily all) of the
structure of our system of ontological levels. We can arrive at this functor in two steps.
First, we must identify a lowest level, i.e., a level on which all levels supervene. If the
system 〈L,S〉 already has a lowest level, then this step is straightforward. But if it has
no lowest level – a possibility to which we return in Section 4.1 – we must construct a
hypothetical level on which all levels supervene, a so-called “inverse limit”. For a posetal
category such as 〈L,S〉, the construction of an inverse limit is possible. (Formally, this
involves extending 〈L,S〉 to a larger category which contains this inverse limit. Of
course, we need not interpret it as anything more than a mathematical construct.) In
the second step, we can associate each level in L with the partition of “lowest-level”
worlds that the given ontological level picks out. In this way, we can map the given
system of ontological levels to some system of levels of grain.24
3.3 Levels of description
Regardless of whether we consider a levelled ontology independently plausible, it is
undeniable that we use different levels of description to think and speak about the world.
In fundamental physics, we describe the world in different terms than in the special
sciences, such as chemistry, biology, psychology, or the social sciences. And within each
of these sciences, there are debates about which level of description is appropriate for the
phenomena of interest: the level of individual molecules versus that of larger aggregates
in physics and chemistry, the level of the cell versus that of the organism or ecosystem
in biology, the level of the brain versus that of the mind in psychology, and the level of
individuals versus that of larger social entities in the social sciences. The notion of a
level of explanation is closely related to that of a level of description. An explanation
at a particular level – say, a macroeconomic explanation – is an explanation that uses
descriptions at that level.
23Formally, this means that S contains a supervenience mapping σ : Ω  Ω′ and also a supervenience
mapping σ′ : Ω′  Ω. It follows from our definitions that each of these mappings must then be bijective
(i.e., injective and surjective). Surjectivity follows from the definition of S. If injectivity were violated,
we would not have σ • σ′ = 1L, thereby contradicting condition (S4) in the previous section.
24I am indebted to Marcus Pivato for suggesting the inverse-limit construction.
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To define a system of levels of description, I begin by introducing the notion of a
language that we may use to talk about the world.25 I define a language, L, as a set of
formal expressions – called sentences – which is endowed with two things:
• a negation operator, denoted ¬, such that, for each sentence φ ∈ L, there exists a
corresponding negated sentence, ¬φ ∈ L;
• a notion of consistency, which deems some sets of sentences consistent and the
remaining sets of sentences inconsistent.26
An example of a language is standard propositional logic. Here L is the set of all
well-formed sentences that can be constructed out of some atomic sentences and the
standard logical connectives (“and”, “or”, “not”, “if-then”, and so on), and we call a set
of sentences consistent if all its members can be simultaneously true. Other examples of
languages are more expressive logics, such as predicate, modal, conditional, and deontic
logics. A Boolean algebra can also qualify as a language in the present sense, where
this algebra is a set A of subsets of some underlying set Ω of possible worlds (with Ω
non-empty), such that A is closed under intersection, union, and complementation. A
standard example is the set of all subsets of Ω. Here the role of “sentences” is played by
elements of A. Any set of such elements is consistent if these elements have a non-empty
intersection. (Recall that each element of A is a subset of Ω.)
Crucially, any language L, as I have defined it, induces a corresponding “ontology”,
understood as a minimally rich set of worlds ΩL such that each world in ΩL “settles”
everything that can be expressed in L. To settle a sentence is to assign a determinate
truth-value to it: either “true” or “false”. If one takes the sentences in L to have truth-
conditions, then one is, in effect, committed to positing such an ontology. The set ΩL
can be interpreted as the set of all possible ways the world could be such that
(i) everything that is expressible in L is settled, and
(ii) nothing else is settled that is not entailed by what is expressible in L.
One cannot take the language L at face value (i.e., be a realist about the contents
expressible in it) without assuming that there is a fact of the matter as to which element
25I borrow the present abstract definition of a language from Dietrich (2007), who introduced it in a
different context, namely that of judgment-aggregation theory.
26The notion of consistency must satisfy three minimal conditions (Dietrich 2007): (i) any sentence-
negation pair {φ,¬φ} is inconsistent; (ii) any superset of any inconsistent set is inconsistent; (iii) the
empty set is consistent and every consistent set has a consistent superset containing a member of each
sentence-negation pair in L.
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of ΩL is the actual one. In that sense, the language L is a “marker” of the associated
ontology ΩL.
For modelling purposes, the easiest way to define the set ΩL is to take it to be
the set of all maximally consistent subsets of L. A maximally consistent subset of L
is a consistent set of sentences to which no further sentences can be added without
undermining consistency. Alternatively, if taking worlds to be maximally consistent
subsets of L is too artificial, we only need to assume that the worlds in ΩL correspond
to the maximally consistent subsets of L.27 We say that a sentence φ ∈ L is true at a
world ω ∈ ΩL if the maximally consistent subset of L to which ω corresponds contains
φ; the sentence is false otherwise. For each sentence φ ∈ L, we write [φ] to denote the
set of worlds in ΩL at which φ is true; we call this the extension of φ.
28
We call any pair consisting of a language L and the induced set of worlds ΩL a level
of description. We can now define a system of levels of description 〈L,S〉 as follows:
• L is some non-empty class of levels of description, each of which is a pair 〈L,ΩL〉;
• S is some class of surjective functions of the form σ : ΩL  ΩL′ , where 〈L,ΩL〉 and
〈L′,ΩL′〉 are levels of description in L, such that S satisfies (S1), (S2), and (S3).
For example, L may contain levels corresponding to fundamental physics, chemistry,
biology, psychology, and the social sciences. Each such level is a pair of an appropriate
level-specific language and the induced set of level-specific worlds. The supervenience
mappings capture the idea that chemical-level worlds supervene on physical-level worlds,
biological-level worlds supervene on chemical-level worlds, and so on. In this way, a sys-
tem of levels of description can capture the different levels corresponding to the different
special sciences; the supervenience mappings between them capture the relationships
between levels. I return to those relationships in Section 4.3, where I discuss whether
supervenience entails reducibility, in a sense to be made precise.29
27Formally, there exists a bijection from ΩL to the set of maximally consistent subsets of L.
28The set of all such extensions, {[φ] : φ ∈ L}, is structurally equivalent to our language L.
29It is worth mentioning one important special case of a system of levels of description. Here, each
pair 〈L,ΩL〉 in L is of the following form: ΩL is some partition Ω∼ of an underlying non-empty set Ω of
possible worlds as in Section 3.1 (where ∼ is the equivalence relation generating that partition), and L
is some canonical algebra AΩ∼over Ω∼ (in the simplest case, the set of all subsets of Ω∼). We can then
define the supervenience mappings in S as in Section 3.1, i.e., two levels 〈AΩ∼ ,Ω∼〉 and 〈AΩ≈ ,Ω≈〉 are
related by some mapping σ : Ω∼  Ω≈ if and only if Ω∼ is at least as fine-grained as Ω≈. A notable
feature of this case is that whenever there is such a mapping between two levels, the higher-level algebra
AΩ≈ is (isomorphic to) a subalgebra of the lower-level algebra AΩ∼ . In particular, each element of AΩ≈
has an inverse image (with respect to σ) in AΩ∼ . As will become clear in Section 4.3, this feature is not
shared by levels of description in general.
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Note that by focusing just on the sets of worlds induced by each level-specific lan-
guage, we can map a system of levels of description to a corresponding system of onto-
logical levels, as defined earlier. Technically, there is a functor from any system of levels
of description to the induced system of ontological levels. However, systems of levels
of description are structurally richer than systems of ontological levels, by encoding de-
scriptions as well as ontologies. Different systems of levels of description could induce
structurally equivalent systems of ontological levels.
3.4 Levels of dynamics
Ever since the development of statistical mechanics, there has been considerable inter-
est in the dynamics of physical and other systems at different levels (or “scales”). A
coin-tossing system can be studied at a microphysical level, where the focus is on the
precise details of the coin’s trajectory as it is being tossed. Alternatively, the system
can be studied at a statistical-mechanical level, where the coin is viewed as a sim-
ple Bernoulli-distributed stochastic process with only two possible outcomes, “heads”
or “tails”. Similarly, the weather, climate, or the economy can each be studied at a
micro-level, where the focus is on detailed processes at a fine-grained resolution, or at
a macro-level, where the system is specified in terms of certain aggregate variables. To
mark this contrast, we often speak of a system’s “higher-level dynamics” and its “lower-
level dynamics”. Practically any interesting dynamic system can be studied at multiple
levels, and as we will see later, the dynamic properties of such a system – for instance,
whether it is deterministic or not – may depend on the level in question.30 I will now
briefly explain how such “levels of dynamics” fit into the present framework.
I begin with a simple definition of a temporally evolving system.31 Let T be some
linearly ordered set of points of time, where “<” stands for the “before” relation. Let X
be some set of states in which the system can be at any time; we call X the system’s state
space. A history of the system is a function from time into the space space, h : T  X,
which assigns to each time t ∈ T the system’s state at that time, denoted h(t). We write
Ω to denote the set of all histories that are permitted by the laws of the system. We
can think of these histories as the nomologically possible ones. The set Ω plays the role
of the set of possible worlds. Collections of histories are called events.
We further require the notion of a conditional probability structure. This is a family of
conditional probability functions, {PrE}E⊆Ω, which contains one conditional probability
30See, e.g., Butterfield (2012), List and Pivato (2015a), and Werndl (2009).
31The definition of a temporally evolving system and its analysis at different levels are based on List
and Pivato (2015a,b). For a more basic analysis without a specification of probabilities, see List (2014).
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function PrE for each event E ⊆ Ω. Each PrE assigns to any event F ⊆ Ω the conditional
probability of that event, given E, denoted PrE(F ). For example, to determine the
conditional probability of some event F in history h at time t, we need to conditionalize
on the event that we have reached time t in history h; so, the probability in question is
PrE(F ), where E is the set of all histories h
′ ∈ Ω that coincide with h up to time t. We
call the pair 〈Ω, {PrE}E⊆Ω〉 a temporally evolving system.
To see how we can study temporally evolving systems at multiple levels, let such
a system be given, and interpret its state space X as a set of lower-level states (e.g.,
microphysical states of some coin-tossing system). Now assume that each state in X
determines (realizes, instantiates) some higher-level state in some other set X ′: a higher-
level state space (e.g., a set of aggregate states such as “heads” or “tails”). For each
higher-level state (an element X ′), there is an equivalence class of lower-level states (a
subset of X) that may realize that higher-level state. For instance, each micro-state of
the billions of individual water molecules in a flask determines a corresponding macro-
state of the water. Let σ : X  X ′ be the function that assigns to each lower-level state
the resulting higher-level state.
We call σ a supervenience mapping from the given lower-level system 〈Ω, {PrE}E⊆Ω〉
to a resulting higher-level system
〈
Ω′, {Pr′E′}E′⊆Ω′
〉
if it has the following properties:
(i) every higher-level state in X ′ has at least one possible lower-level realizing state in
X according to σ, where X and X ′ are the two systems’ state spaces; formally, the
function σ : X  X ′ is surjective;
(ii) the set Ω determines the set Ω′ via σ; formally, σ induces a surjective mapping from
Ω to Ω′: for each history h ∈ Ω, σ(h) = h′, where, for each t ∈ T , h′(t) = σ(h(t));
(iii) the probability structure {PrE}E⊆Ω determines the probability structure
{Pr′E′}E′⊆Ω′ via σ; formally, for any pair of events E′, F ′ ⊆ Ω′, Pr′E′(F ′) = PrE(F ),
where E and F are the inverse images of E′ and F ′ under σ, respectively.32
We are now in a position to define a system of levels, 〈L,S〉:
• L is some non-empty class of “level-specific” temporally evolving systems, where,
for each set Ω, L contains at most one system 〈Ω, {PrE}E⊆Ω〉 whose set of histories
is Ω (i.e., each Ω is endowed with a unique conditional probability structure);
• S is some class of supervenience mappings with the properties just defined, such
that S satisfies (S1), (S2), and (S3).
32In line with the previous definition, the inverse image of any E′ ⊆ Ω′ under σ is {h ∈ Ω : σ(h) ∈ E′}.
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So, when two level-specific temporally evolving systems in L are related via a superve-
nience mapping σ in S, the dynamics of the higher-level system is determined by the
dynamics of the lower-level system: higher-level states (in X ′) supervene on lower-level
states (in X), and higher-level histories as well as higher-level probabilities are deter-
mined by lower-level ones.33 We are then able to consider how the dynamics at different
levels relate to one another; I return to this issue in Section 4.2.
Again, the present example of a system of levels can be related to one of our earlier
examples. By focusing just on the sets of level-specific histories, where each history
is interpreted as a possible world, we can map any system of level-specific dynamic
systems to a corresponding system of ontological levels, as defined in Section 3.2. We
have thereby constructed a functor from a system of levels of the present kind to one
of the earlier kind. Of course, level-specific probabilistic information is lost under this
functor. In that sense, a system of level-specific dynamic systems is structurally richer
than a system of ontological levels under the earlier definition.
4 Some illustrative philosophical questions
As we have seen, the present framework can capture a variety of instances of systems
of levels, where levels may be interpreted either as levels of description or as ontological
levels, and in some cases in both ways. I will now show how the framework can be
brought to bear on some familiar philosophical questions. As already noted, my aim
is not to give conclusive answers to these questions, but merely to suggest that the
framework can be used to approach the relevant debates in a helpful way.
4.1 Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at
the bottom?
A positive answer to this question is widely assumed, but seldom carefully defended, as
Jonathan Schaffer notes. He quotes Jaegwon Kim at length:
“The Cartesian model of a bifurcated world has been replaced by that of
a layered world, a hierarchically stratified structure of ‘levels’ or ‘orders’ of
entities and their characteristic properties. It is generally thought that there
is a bottom level, one consisting of whatever microphysics is going to tell
us are the most basic physical particles out of which all matter is composed
(electrons, neutrons, quarks, or whatever).”34
33As noted in List and Pivato (2015b), the higher-level system is a factor system of the lower-level one.
34See Kim (1993, p. 337), quoted in Schaffer (2003).
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Similarly, David Owens writes:
“[T]he levels metaphor naturally suggests itself as a way of visualizing the
structure of science. According to this picture, there is a hierarchy made up
of different levels of explanation. Physics is at the base of this hierarchy and
the rest of the structure depends upon it.”35
Are we justified in assuming that there is a linearly ordered hierarchy of this kind,
with a fundamental level at the bottom? The first thing to note is that the question
of whether levels are linearly ordered is distinct from the question of whether there is
a fundamental level at the bottom. A system of levels 〈L,S〉 is linear if the levels in
L are totally ordered by the supervenience mappings, i.e., supervenience is transitive,
antisymmetric, and complete.36 The system 〈L,S〉 has a fundamental level if there is
some level in L on which every level supervenes. The abstract definition of a system of
levels that I have given does not automatically secure either of these properties.
First consider linearity. A system of levels is, in general, only partially ordered.37
The relation of supervenience is transitive (as well as reflexive), but not generally anti-
symmetric or complete. While systems of levels of grain are antisymmetric by definition
(in that no two distinct levels of grain can mutually supervene on each other), systems
of the other kinds (e.g., systems of ontological levels or levels of description) need not
be antisymmetric: two distinct levels could supervene on one another. Further, com-
pleteness need not be satisfied either. It is not generally the case that, for any two
levels L and L′, either L supervenes on L′ or vice versa (or both). Only special cases
of systems of levels are totally ordered. Even if we define levels in the simplest way,
as levels of grain, the resulting system of levels is only partially ordered by the relation
“at least as fine-grained as”. Although the terminology of “levels” is conventional, the
alternative terminology of “scales” captures the lack of a linear hierarchy: there can be
many different scales, which need not form a single hierarchy.
A partially ordered system of levels, in turn, could include more than one linearly
ordered chain, where different such chains meet at most in a few places. For example,
the system of levels could look like a tree, or even an upside-down tree, where some levels
supervene on – or subvene – others that do not themselves stand in any supervenience
relation relative to each other. For example, a scenario in which, for each level L, there
35See Owens (1989, p. 59).
36I have already defined transitivity. Antisymmetry means that if L supervenes on L′ and L′ also
supervenes on L, then L = L′. Completeness means that, for any two levels L and L′, L supervenes on
L′ or L′ supervenes on L.
37For a similar observation, see also List and Pivato (2015a, fn. 41).
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are two distinct levels L′ and L′′ such that L supervenes on each of them is entirely
coherent. If levels are given by level-specific sets of worlds, then L = Ω might supervene
on each of L′ = Ω×Φ and L′′ = Ω×Ψ, where Φ and Ψ are disjoint. Here, each world at
level L′ is an ordered pair consisting of an element of Ω and an element of Φ, and each
world at level L′′ is an ordered pair consisting of an element of Ω and an element of Ψ.
The supervenience mappings from L′ to L and from L′′ to L then map each L′-level world
or each L′′-level world to their first component. Figure 1 illustrates such a scenario.
Figure 1: A non-linear system of levels
...
↑
L1 0
L′ L′′1 0 1 0
... ... ... ...
Next consider the question of a fundamental level. In general, there need not exist a
level on which every level supervenes. If there were a fundamental level, say with a set
Ω of “bottom-level” worlds, then any world in Ω would determine not only all facts at
the fundamental level, but also all higher-level facts, via the appropriate supervenience
mappings. We might then interpret an element of Ω as a “world simpliciter”. However,
a partially ordered system of levels could have multiple distinct lowest levels: one for
each linearly ordered chain. Furthermore, a system of levels, whether totally ordered
or not, could have infinitely descending chains, in which each level supervenes on an
even lower level, as in the example of Figure 1. Technically, a system of levels need
not be well-founded. This observation is consistent with Jonathan Schaffer’s conclusion
that there is no evidence in favour of the assumption that there is a fundamental level.
Schaffer himself defends a “metaphysic of infinite descent”.38 The present framework
confirms the coherence of such a scenario.39
38See Schaffer (2003, p. 499).
39For an earlier discussion of this point, see List and Pivato (2015a). As noted in Section 3.2 above, for
a system of ontological levels, where each level is a set of level-specific worlds, it is possible to construct
an inverse limit. So, any system of ontological levels without a fundamental level can be mathematically
viewed as a subsystem of a larger system in which there is a fundamental level. Of course, this larger
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What does this imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the
physical? The exact meaning of “physicalism” depends, among other things, on how we
define “the physical”.40 We could either define “the physical” in terms of our current
best account of what the fundamental physical facts are. Or, alternatively, we could
define “the physical” in terms of the best future account of those facts, whatever it turns
out to be. Irrespective of the definition we adopt, however, the thesis that everything
supervenes on the physical can be true only if there is some level on which all other
levels supervene, i.e., a fundamental level. If there is no such level, physicalism is a non-
starter. At best, physicalism could be true as a claim about a certain subclass of levels
– those that do in fact supervene on the physical level. Perhaps the meteorological and
chemical levels supervene on the physical one, for example. But as an all-encompassing
thesis, physicalism would be structurally false if a particular kind of bottomless levelled
ontology were vindicated. Alternatively, we could define a weaker notion of physicalism,
according to which some subclass of levels, say Lphys ⊆ L, is designated as “physical”,
where every level in L supervenes on some level in Lphys. This, however, is a watered-
down notion of physicalism.
It should be clear, then, that the question of whether or not there is a fundamental
level has far-reaching philosophical consequences. Since – conceptually speaking – a
system of levels need not have a fundamental level, physicalism seems to stand on weaker
ground than usually acknowledged.
4.2 Are there emergent properties?
For present purposes, a level-specific property is a property that may be instantiated by a
world or object at a particular level. A higher-level property, in particular, is a property
that may be instantiated by a world or object at a higher level. The notion of emergence
refers to the idea that some properties may be instantiated at some higher level with-
out being simultaneously instantiated at any lower level. Emergence is consistent with
supervenience. We may say that a higher-level property is emergent if it supervenes on
lower-level properties but is not generally accompanied by some corresponding (“type-
equivalent”) lower-level property. By contrast, we may say that a higher-level property
is matched at the lower level if it is always accompanied by a corresponding lower-level
property. Of course, these informal definitions can be made more precise.
As there is a sizeable literature on the topic of emergence, I will review only a single
system could be a mere mathematical construct.
40On the notion of physicalism, see, e.g., Stoljar (2010).
18
example, namely that of emergent indeterminism.41 Consider a temporally evolving
system (as defined in Section 3.4) whose histories across five time periods, t = 1, 2, ..., 5,
are as shown in Figure 2.42 Each dot represents one state in the state space X, and each
path through the figure from bottom to top represents one possible history. The set of
Figure 2: Lower-level histories
(reproduced from List 2014)
Figure 3: Higher-level histories
(reproduced from List 2014)
all such paths is Ω. Clearly, all histories in Ω are deterministic, in the sense that any
initial segment of any history admits only a single possible continuation in Ω.43
Now consider the temporally evolving system at a higher, more macroscopic level.
We interpret the original states in X and the histories in Ω as lower-level histories,
41For earlier analyses of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Butterfield (2012), List (2014), List and Pivato
(2015a), and Werndl (2009).
42The present example comes from List (2014).
43Formally, for any history h : T  X, the initial segment of h up to time t, denoted ht, is the restriction
of the function h to all points in time up to t. History h′ is a continuation of an initial segment ht if
h′t = ht. History h is deterministic if every initial segment of h has only one continution in Ω, namely h
itself. History h is indeterministic if some initial segment of h has more than one continuation in Ω.
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and introduce a higher-level state space X ′ that results from X via a many-to-one
supervenience mapping. Specifically, suppose that any lower-level states that lie in same
rectangular box in Figure 2 realize the same higher-level state. So, the supervenience
mapping treats all lower-level states within the same box in the grid as belonging to the
same equivalence class. Figure 3 shows the image of Figure 2 under this supervenience
mapping. The thick dots represent higher-level states, and the possible paths through the
figure from bottom to top represent possible histories, this time at the higher level. Note
that the set Ω′ of higher-level histories is the image of Ω under the given supervenience
mapping. Clearly, higher-level histories are indeterministic in this example: the initial
segment of any higher-level history admits more than one possible continuation in Ω′.44
The example shows that indeterminism may be an emergent property. A temporally
evolving system may display indeterminism at a higher level, consistently with determin-
ism at a lower level. One may not even be able to ask meaningfully whether a system is
deterministic or indeterministic simpliciter. The answer to this question depends entirely
on the level at which we are considering the system.45 Determinism and indeterminism
are examples of level-specific properties.
Needless to say, there are many other real-world instances of level-specific properties.
An example is the property of being in a particular intentional state, such as believing
or desiring something. This can only be instantiated by a person at a psychological
level. A person’s physical organism does not have that property. Indeed, it would be
a category mistake to employ that property at a lower level: it does not belong to the
vocabulary of fundamental physics or even to that of neuro-physiology. Similarly, a
particular unemployment rate is a higher-level property; this can only be instantiated
by a society or an economy, but not by its physical supervenience base.
4.3 Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones?
It is often assumed that because higher-level phenomena supervene on lower-level ones,
we should also be able to explain all higher-level phenomena in terms of lower-level
ones. The idea, in short, is that supervenience implies explanatory reducibility. Because
chemical phenomena supervene on physical ones, for example, we should ultimately be
able to explain chemical phenomena in terms of physical ones. Similarly, because social
phenomena supervene on the interactions of a large number of individuals, we should
ultimately be able to explain social phenomena in terms of individual-level processes. If
44Formally, determinism and indeterminism are defined as they are at the lower level, except that the
quantification is now over higher-level histories (in Ω′) rather than lower-level histories (in Ω).
45For earlier arguments for this claim, see List and Pivato (2015a) and relatedly Werndl (2009).
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those reductionistic claims were true, then higher-level descriptions would be dispensable
for many purposes. They might be nothing more than shorthand notations for certain
things that we could equally express at a lower level.
However, as several philosophers have argued in relation to domains ranging from
the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of social science, supervenience does not imply
explanatory reducibility.46 If we were to dispense with higher-level descriptions, we
would run the risk of overlooking some higher-level patterns in the world.47 Systematic
regularities in the world are not confined to the physical level or some other lower
level. Rather, they can occur at higher levels too. For example, the causes that make a
counterfactual difference to some effect may sometimes be certain higher-level properties,
rather than their lower-level realizers.48 The difference-making cause of a decrease in
inflation may be the increase in the interest rate by the central bank – a higher-level
property – rather than its individual-level or physical-level realizers. While inflation may
systematically co-vary with the interest rate, it need not equally systematically co-vary
with any particular lower-level realizing properties on which the interest rate supervenes.
The present framework lends further support to the claim that higher-level descrip-
tions may be irreducible to lower-level ones, even if there is a fundamental level on which
all other levels supervene. (If there is no fundamental level, then all levels are higher
levels relative to some other levels, and so the attempt to “reduce away” higher-level
descriptions could not get off the ground.) Consider a system of levels of description, as
introduced in Section 3.3, and assume that there is a fundamental level at the bottom,
given by the pair 〈L,ΩL〉, where L is the level-specific language – say that of fundamen-
tal physics – and ΩL is the level-specific set of worlds. Let us make two assumptions.
First, ΩL is an infinite set. This is a reasonable assumption; plausibly, infinitely many
worlds are compatible with the fundamental laws of nature, provided that we allow vari-
ations in initial conditions. Second, the language L is countable; i.e., it admits infinitely
many expressions but no more than there are natural numbers. This is also a reasonable
assumption; all familiar languages are countable, from propositional logic to English.
Now let us turn to some higher level of description, given by the pair 〈L′,ΩL′〉, where
L′ is some higher-level language and ΩL′ is the corresponding set of higher-level worlds.
Let σ be the supervenience mapping from the fundamental level to the present higher
level; formally, this is a surjective function of the form σ : ΩL  ΩL′ . We want to
know whether all higher-level descriptions are “reducible” to corresponding lower-level
46See, e.g., Putnam (1967), Fodor (1974), Owens (1989), Sawyer (2002, 2003), List and Pettit (2011),
List and Spiekermann (2013), and Dietrich and List (2016, Section 8).
47See, e.g., Dennett (1991).
48See, e.g., List and Menzies (2009, 2010). On higher-level causation, see also Glynn (2013).
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descriptions, so that we would then be able to translate higher-level explanations into
lower-level ones. Call a higher-level sentence φ′ ∈ L′ reducible to a lower-level sentence
from L if it is extensionally equivalent (modulo supervenience) to some sentence in L:
there is some sentence φ ∈ L whose extension (in ΩL) is the inverse image, under σ, of
the extension (in ΩL′) of φ
′; formally, [φ] = σ−1([φ′]). It is important to note that, if
the language L is closed under conjunction and disjunction, as in the case of standard
propositional logic, then reducibility to a single sentence is equivalent to reducibility to
any finite logical combination of sentences (because any such logical combination can be
expressed as a single composite sentence). If every higher-level sentence were reducible
to a corresponding lower-level sentence (or a finite combination of lower-level sentences),
then we might indeed consider higher-level descriptions dispensable, at least in principle.
Higher-level explanations would be translatable into lower-level ones.
However, there is an important combinatorial reason why reducibility is the exception
rather than the rule, as I will now explain.49 The supervenience of the higher level on
the lower level entails that:
(i) the inverse image, under σ, of the extension of any higher-level sentence is some
subset of ΩL.
However, it does not follow that:
(ii) this subset can be described by some sentence (or by a finite combination of sen-
tences) from the lower-level language L.
For reducibility, both (i) and (ii) are needed; (i) alone is not enough. Why might (ii)
fail? The set ΩL, being infinite, has uncountably many subsets, of which L allows us to
describe only countably many. Since L is countable, the set of subsets of ΩL that can be
finitely described in L is also countable. Therefore, almost all subsets of ΩL – namely
all except a countable number – do not admit a finite description in L. For almost
every subset of ΩL, then, there exists no sentence in L (or even a finite combination of
sentences) whose extension is that subset. Of course, it it is logically possible that two
levels of description are so well aligned that all higher-level sentences can be reduced to
equivalent lower-level sentences, in that the inverse images of their extensions are the
extensions of some lower-level sentences. But, from a combinatorial perspective, this is
a highly special case. It would be surprising – a “cosmic coincidence” – if the levels
corresponding to different special sciences turned out to be like this.
The bottom line is that, even when there is a supervenience relation between a
lower level and a higher one, higher-level descriptions are not generally reducible to
49The present argument draws on List and Pivato (2015a, Section 8).
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lower-level desciptions. And even in those special cases in which a higher-level sentence
can be reduced to some lower-level sentence (or a finite combination of sentences), this
translation may well be so cumbersome and uneconomical as to be of little practical use:
for instance, the lower-level sentences might be unmanageably long. So, higher-level
descriptions may be irreducible in practice, even if they are not irreducible in principle.
4.4 Can we represent the is-ought relationship in a levelled framework?
There is much discussion about the relationship between normative and non-normative
domains of discourse.50 How does the normative domain relate to the non-normative one
(the “descriptive” domain)? I will here take the normative domain to be represented by
language involving “obligation” and “permission” operators (“ought” and “may”), while
I will take the non-normative domain to be represented by language that is free from
such operators. For the sake of argument, I will assume that the sentences we express
in normative language can be true or false. That is: there are truth-conditions for the
normative domain, just as there are truth-conditions for the descriptive domain. Some
people, notably non-cognitivists, reject this assumption. Even among those who accept
the existence of truth-conditions for the normative domain, there is little agreement on
what those truth-conditions are or on how they relate to the truth-conditions for the
descriptive domain. Naturalists, for instance, think that normative truths supervene
on non-normative ones, while non-naturalists disagree. I suggest that we can helpfully
think about the relationship between the normative and non-normative domains by
representing them as two different levels of description, with their associated ontologies.
Let L denote some descriptive, non-normative language, and let ΩL be the associated
set of worlds. We can think of L as our non-normative “base language”, and we can
think of the worlds in ΩL as fully specifying all descriptive facts. We now augment
the language by introducing normative terms. For present purposes, these will be the
deontic operators “it is obligatory that” and “it is permissible that”. I assume that
these operators have the standard properties assumed in deontic logic. (My arguments
could equally be developed if the normative language were specified differently.) Let L+
be the “normatively augmented” language. While the original language L can express
only descriptive discourse, the augmented language L+ can express both descriptive and
normative discourse. I suggest that we can think of L and L+ as giving rise to two
different levels of description.
Our central question is this: what set ΩL+ of worlds is associated with L
+, and
how does it relate to ΩL, the set of worlds associated with L? In other words, how is
50For a recent discussion of the is-ought gap, see Brown (2014).
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the normative level, 〈L+,ΩL+〉, related to the non-normative one, 〈L,ΩL〉? In particu-
lar, is there a supervenience mapping σ : ΩL  ΩL+ and/or a supervenience mapping
σ+ : ΩL+  ΩL? I will argue that there exists a supervenience mapping from ΩL+ to
ΩL, but that the converse holds only in special cases.
The first thing to note is that since L+ is an augmented version of L, every sentence
from L is also contained in L+. And so, since any world in ΩL+ settles all sentences
from L+, it must also settle all sentences from L. This shows that, to each world ω+
in ΩL+ , there corresponds a world ω in ΩL such that ω
+ and ω assign the same truth-
values to all sentences from L. Let σ+ be the function that maps each ω+ ∈ ΩL+ to the
corresponding ω ∈ ΩL. If we assume that any consistent subset of L remains consistent
when viewed as a subset of L+, it follows further that, for every world ω ∈ ΩL, there
exists at least one world ω+ ∈ ΩL+ with σ+(ω+) = ω. Therefore σ+ is surjective. This
establishes the existence of a supervenience mapping σ+ : ΩL+  ΩL.
What about the converse? The sentences in L+, unlike those in L, may involve the
operators “it is obligatory that” and “it is permissible that”, abbreviated “O” and “P”.
In line with standard deontic logic, we assume that Oφ is true at some world if and only
if φ is true at all worlds that are permissible relative to that world. The permissible
worlds, in turn, are specified by a selection function, f , which assigns to each world a
set of permissible worlds relative to the given world. Similarly, Pφ is true at some world
if and only if φ is true at some world that is permissible relative to it. But over which
worlds should we quantify in this definition? Should we quantify over the worlds in ΩL+
or over the worlds in ΩL?
Clearly, if we take the selection function f as given, we do not need to quantify
over worlds from ΩL+ . Given f , all the information needed to define the truth-values
of Oφ and Pφ is already encoded in the “non-normative” worlds from ΩL. So, any
world ω ∈ ΩL, together with the selection function f , settles all the sentences from L+,
including those that go beyond L. In other words, if the selection function f is held
fixed in the background, we can identify ΩL+ with ΩL, and, by implication, there is a
supervenience mapping σ : ΩL  ΩL+ . We can then think of L+ and L as two different
languages whose associated ontologies are essentially the same, despite the fact that L+
is expressively richer than L. On this picture, normative and non-normative forms of
discourse refer to the same world, just described differently. This, I think, is the picture
that proponents of naturalism about normativity have in mind.
By contrast, if we do not take the selection function f as given, the supervenience
of the normative level on the non-normative one breaks down. Without the function f ,
the worlds in ΩL are insufficient to settle everything that can be expressed in L
+. The
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truth-values of sentences such as Oφ and Pφ are left open. So, worlds in ΩL encode
strictly less information than worlds in ΩL+ . Note that, for something to qualify as a
world in ΩL+ , it must settle everything that can be expressed in L
+.
Let F be some set of admissible selection functions. In order to settle everything
that can be expressed in L+, we require not only a world ω ∈ ΩL, but also a selection
function f ∈ F . We may thus define ΩL+ as the set of all possible pairs of the form 〈ω, f〉,
formally ΩL+ = ΩL×F (or a suitable subset thereof). Any world in ΩL+ , formally a pair
〈ω, f〉, will then suffice to settle all sentences in L+. As before, there is a supervenience
mapping σ+ : ΩL+  ΩL, but the converse is no longer generally true. The mapping
from ΩL+ to ΩL can be many-to-one. However, there is one important special case in
which there exists a supervenience mapping σ : ΩL  ΩL+ . This is the case in which F is
singleton: there exists only a single admissible selection function. In this case, ΩL+ and
ΩL are isomorphic (so that they can essentially be identified with one another), which
is again the picture that naturalists have in mind.
Recall that there are different notions of supervenience. Earlier I gave the examples
of metaphysical and nomological supervenience. We can now observe the following:
relative to a given selection function, the normative level does indeed supervene on the
non-normative one. This is a form of relativized supervenience, i.e., supervenience relative
to some further parameter, here the selection function f . Without such a relativization,
the normative level does not supervene on the non-normative one. Perhaps the hidden
assumption underlying naturalism is just a particular choice of selection function.
4.5 What is the relationship between third-personal and first-personal
levels?
As conscious subjects, we are not merely biological organisms that function in certain
ways and can be studied from some external perspective, but we ourselves experience
the world from a first-person perspective. There is something it is like to be a conscious
subject, as Thomas Nagel puts it.51 By contrast, many entities and systems in the world,
including some fairly complex ones, have no conscious experiences. The weather system,
an eco-system, the global economy, and a smartphone are each systems of considerable
complexity, and yet – for all we know – there is nothing it is like to be such a system.
We can study these systems from the outside – from a third-personal perspective – but
they have no “inner life”: there is no first-personal perspective attached to them.
How does consciousness fit into our scientific worldview? David Chalmers describes
51See Nagel (1974).
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the explanatory challenge as follows:
“[T]he distinctive task of a science of consciousness is to systematically inte-
grate two key classes of data into a scientific framework: third-person data
about behavior and brain processes, and first-person data about subjective
experience. When a conscious system is observed from the third-person point
of view, a range of specific behavioral and neural phenomena present them-
selves. When a conscious system is observed from the first-person point of
view, a range of specific subjective phenomena present themselves... [B]oth
sorts of phenomena have the status of data for a science of consciousness.”52
Crucially, Chalmers argues, first-personal data cannot be explained solely in terms of
third-personal data; first-personal data are, in an important sense, “irreducible”. This
echoes Nagel’s earlier point:
“[First-personal experience] is not captured by any of the familiar . . . re-
ductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with
its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of func-
tional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or
automata that behaved liked people though they experienced nothing.”53
Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, deny that first-personal experience is ir-
reducible to third-personal phenomena or that it needs to be explained at all.54 But,
arguably, such a view fails to do justice to the phenomenon of conscious experience. I
suggest that we can helpfully think about the relationship between first-personal and
third-personal phenomena by viewing them as phenomena on different levels. To explain
this point in a simple way, I will use the variant of my framework in which levels are
identified with level-specific sets of worlds. (The point could also be developed in a more
sophisticated way, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.)
Let me begin with the third-personal level. We can represent this level as a set of
possible worlds that are specified as richly as necessary to capture all third-personal
facts. Call this set Ω3rd. Depending on whether we are interested in metaphysical or
nomological possibility, the elements of Ω3rd could be either all metaphysically possible
third-personal worlds or alternatively all nomologically possible ones, i.e., those worlds
that are compatible with the laws of nature. The present framework permits both
interpretations. (Furthermore, strictly speaking, there is not just one third-personal
52See Chalmers (2004).
53See Nagel (1974, p. 436).
54See, e.g., Dennett (2005).
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level, but there are many, corresponding to the different special sciences, as already
discussed. However, if Ω3rd corresponds to the fundamental physical level, we might
think of the other third-personal levels as supervening on that level. So, we can take
Ω3rd to correspond to the bottom level within some partially ordered (sub)system of
third-personal levels – assuming, for the sake of argument, that such a level exists.)
Any world ω in Ω3rd encodes all third-personal facts. For example, if there are
biological organisms in the world, ω encodes all facts about their brains, bodies, and
behaviour, as well as all facts about their environment. At the same time, ω does not
encode any first-personal facts. How exactly a subject’s first-personal perspective is
related to ω, or indeed whether there is such a perspective at all, is left open. David
Lewis makes an analogous point as follows:
“Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain possible world,
and they know exactly which world it is. Therefore they know every propo-
sition that is true at their world. Insofar as knowledge is a propositional
attitude [with third-personal content], they are omniscient. Still I can imag-
ine them to suffer ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he is.”55
Put differently, a third-personal world does not specify the place of any first-personal
subject inside that world – the “I”. Even an omniscient being, as in Lewis’s thought
experiment, would not be able to infer his or her own first-personal perspective from
the totality of third-personal facts, if those were the only facts to which he or she had
access. The first-personal subject is absent from a world such as ω. It is then reasonable
to conclude that the first-personal facts are not determined by the third-personal facts.
In order to place a subject inside the world, we need to specify something above
and beyond the third-personal world ω, namely a “locus of subjectivity”.56 Call this
pi. This encodes a subject’s first-personal perspective on ω; the letter “pi” stands for
“perspective”. A first-personal world, then, is a pair 〈ω, pi〉, consisting of a third-personal
world and a perspective on it. Formally, this is analogous to what philosophers call a
centred world : a world paired with some location or “centre”.57 Yet this notion is
typically understood more narrowly than what is required here: centres are often defined
as spatio-temporal locations within a world, akin to the dot indicating your current
location on your smartphone map. By contrast, I interpret a “locus of subjectivity” more
broadly, namely as encoding a subject’s entire first-personal perspective on ω, however
55See Lewis (1979, p. 520). Lewis’s main point is subtly different from mine (his topic is indexical
belief, not first-personal experience), but the lesson of his quote carries over to my discussion.
56This echoes some ideas from phenomenology. For a survey, see, e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi (2015).
57Centred worlds go back to Quine (1969) and Lewis (1979). For a helpful discussion, see Liao (2012).
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richly this may need to be specified. It may include, for instance, a full specification of
the subject’s phenomenal experience.58
The pair 〈ω, pi〉 encodes the totality of facts about the world ω, with pi placed inside
it as the locus of subjectivity. By definition, this subsumes both third-personal and first-
personal facts. To be clear: to say that the pair 〈ω, pi〉 is “my” first-personal world is
not to say that I know all the facts specified by 〈ω, pi〉. Rather, the pair 〈ω, pi〉 captures
everything that is true about the world that I inhabit, with myself as the locus of
subjectivity. I may be – and typically will be – ignorant of many of those truths.
We can identify the first-personal level with the set of all possible first-personal
worlds. Call this set Ω1st. Formally, it is some subset of Ω3rd × Π, the set of all pos-
sible pairs 〈ω, pi〉 with ω ∈ Ω3rd and pi ∈ Π, where Π is some universal set of “loci of
subjectivity”. Again, we can understand Ω1st either as the set of all metaphysically
possible first-personal worlds or as the set of all nomologically possible such worlds.
Depending on the interpretation, Ω1st may or may not coincide with the entire set
Ω3rd × Π. Plausibly, only certain specific loci of subjectivity are compatible with each
third-personal world, where “compatibility”, in turn, might be understood metaphysi-
cally or nomologically. For example, it might be that a locus of subjectivity must be
associated with an entity with the appropriate consciousness-supporting make-up, such
as a living, non-comatose, and non-sleeping organism with a brain. Or perhaps, many
more loci of subjectivity are compatible with each third-personal world. On a panpsy-
chist view, for instance, a very large number of first-personal perspectives may each be
compatible with a given third-personal world. On such a view, even some very simple sys-
tems may have their own “perspective”. In short, we might have different philosophical
and/or scientific views about how exactly the third-personal facts constrain the available
first-personal perspectives.59 We can define a psychophysical law as a specification of
58Chalmers (1996, p. 144) notes that a centred world, in the standard narrow sense, would be insuffi-
cient to capture a subject’s entire first-personal perspective, including his or her phenomenal experience.
He writes: “indexicals [whose propositional content may be represented by a set of centred worlds] ac-
company facts about conscious experience in their failure to supervene logically on physical facts, but
they are all settled by the addition of a thin ‘indexical fact’ about the location of the agent in ques-
tion. But even when we give [the agent] perfect knowledge about her indexical relation to everything
in the physical world, her knowledge of [e.g.] red experiences will not be improved in the slightest. In
lacking phenomenal knowledge, she lacks far more than someone lacking indexical knowledge.” These
observations underline the need to adopt a broad interpretation of a locus of subjectivity.
59For instance, integrated information theory, a recent popular theory of consciousness, would suggest
that first-personal perspectives must always be associated with loci of maximal informational integration
in a system (for an overview, see Tononi and Koch 2015). According to this theory, then, a first-personal
perspective pi is compatible with a third-personal world ω if and only if pi is appropriately associated
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which pairs of the form 〈ω, pi〉 are included in Ω1st and which are not.
Once we represent the third-personal and first-personal levels in this way – namely in
terms of the level-specific sets of worlds Ω3rd and Ω1st – we can analyze their relationship
formally. The first thing to note is this. Since first-personal worlds, as I have defined
them, are richer than third-personal worlds, there is a supervenience mapping from Ω1st
to Ω3rd. Thus, the third-personal level supervenes on the first-personal one. At first,
this may sound counterintuitive: an apparent claim about the primacy of the subjective.
However, I am not saying that third-personal worlds supervene on “pure” first-personal
perspectives; i.e., I am not saying that there is supervenience mapping from the set Π
of perspectives to the set Ω3rd of third-personal worlds. Rather, the mapping is from
the set Ω1st to the set Ω3rd, and although I have called the elements of Ω1st “first-
personal worlds”, we can think of them as “first-personally enriched” worlds. Under this
interpretation, it is not surprising that the third-personal worlds, being less rich, can
supervene on them.
Does there also exist a converse supervenience mapping, i.e., from Ω3rd to Ω1st?
Materialists typically give an affirmative answer, dualists a negative one.60 To compare
these answers in the present framework, consider first the materialist answer. If there is
a supervenience mapping from from Ω3rd to Ω1st, then – since there is also a superve-
nience mapping from Ω1st to Ω3rd – the sets Ω3rd and Ω1st must stand in a one-to-one
correspondence: the existence of supervenience mappings in both directions entails that
there is exactly one first-personal world corresponding to each third-personal world.61
This implies, in particular, that only one locus of subjectivity is compatible with each
third-personal world. But is this plausible?
Perhaps – and this is very speculative – if we could somehow hold the subject fixed,
for example by focusing just on myself, then there might be just one way in which this
particular subject – my own “I” – can be placed in the world. For example, it might
be nomologically impossible for this particular “I” to be associated with any physical
substrate distinct from my actual biological body and brain. So, relative to myself as a
subject, each third-personal world ω might be consistent with only one perspective pi. If
so, my own first-personal world 〈ω, pi〉 would supervene on the third-personal world ω, in
this relativized sense of supervenience. Formally, for each ω, the set Ω1st would contain
with some locus of maximal informational integration in ω. A functionally awake human cortex is an
example of such a locus, while an ecosystem or a current-generation smartphone is not.
60Here, supervenience is usually understood metaphysically. Chalmers (1996) suggests that conscious-
ness may supervene nomologically on physical properties, relative to some psychophysical law.
61As noted before, if there is a supervenience mapping σ : Ω
3rd  Ω1st and also a supervenience
mapping σ′ : Ω1st  Ω3rd, then both of these mappings must be bijective.
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a unique pair 〈ω, pi〉 with ω as the first component. We would then have to interpret
Ω1st as the set of all possible first-personal worlds for the given fixed subject.
However, as soon as we recognize that there are many subjects that can each have
their own first-personal perspective on the same third-personal world ω – not just myself,
but also you and every other conscious being – it becomes implausible to assume that
each third-personal world ω can be paired only with a single locus of subjectivity. Rather,
there are many different possible first-personal worlds of the form 〈ω, pi〉, which share
the same third-personal world as a component. We can think of these first-personal
worlds as different “first-personal realizers” of the same third-personal world. If this is
right, then first-personal and third-personal worlds stand in a many-to-one relationship,
rather than a one-to-one relationship; and only the third-personal level supervenes on
the first-personal, not the other way round, contrary to the materialist picture.
We can observe something else: since different subjects, by definition, “inhabit” dif-
ferent first-personal worlds, there is no such thing as the first-personal world simpliciter,
i.e., a first-personal world that we all share: you, I, and everyone else. Rather, as con-
scious subjects, we all live in different first-personal worlds – in effect, “parallel” ones –
which are distinct first-personal-level realizers of the same shared third-personal world.
Of course, our physical organisms can be thought of as entities within the same shared
third-personal world. We can think of the present picture as a “many-worlds model of
consciousness”.62 For each subject, there is an actual first-personal world, but this is
different for different subjects. There is also an actual third-personal world : the one that
is realized by all those actual first-personal worlds. Just as higher-level worlds are often
multiply realizable by lower-level worlds, so third-personal worlds are multiply realizable
by first-personal worlds.
The present framework also allows us to address the much-discussed topic of zombies,
on which materialists and dualists disagree.63 A zombie is a hypothetical being which
62The idea of “many worlds” is sometimes invoked in relation to consciousness. Chalmers (1996, ch.
10) suggests that his dualistic theory may be combined with Everett’s “many-worlds” interpretation of
quantum mechanics. However, he distinguishes between the “splitting-worlds” variant of the Everett
view (a genuine “many-worlds” interpretation, which he rejects as a misinterpretation of Everett) and
the “one-big-world” variant (which he prefers). According to the latter, “[t]here is only one world, but
it has more in it than we might have thought” (p. 347). Specifically, each conscious mind “perceives a
separate discrete world, corresponding to the sort of world that we perceive – call this a miniworld, as
opposed to the maxiworld of the superposition. The real world is a maxiworld, and the miniworlds are
merely in the minds of the subjects” (ibid.). There would then still be a single world underlying all the
different first-personal (mini)worlds. This differs from the “many-worlds” model I have sketched, but in
my framework the first-personal level could also supervene on an even more fundamental level.
63For an overview, see, e.g., Chalmers (1996).
30
is physically and functionally indistinguishable from a human being like you or me, but
which nonetheless lacks any first-personal consciousness. A zombie has the exact same
third-personal properties as its conscious counterpart: its bodily make-up is the same,
as is its brain-functioning; it behaves and speaks in the same way as you or I do. It just
lacks first-personal consciousness. While a conscious being has a conscious perspective
on the world, the zombie does not. Now, importantly, no-one in the mainstream debate
suggests that there are zombies in the real world. Rather, the debate concerns the
question of whether the notion of a zombie is coherent: are zombies metaphysically
possible or not? Dualists answer in the affirmative, materialists in the negative. Let me
use the term “zombie scenario” to refer to a scenario in which the world is physically
or third-personally indistinguishable from the actual world but in which there is no
first-personal consciousness. Is this scenario coherent?
The framework I have sketched suggests that it is. I have argued that we can model
consciousness by recognizing that there is a first-personal level in addition to the third-
personal one, where the first-personal level subvenes the third-personal one, rather than
supervenes on it. (Recall that other, “higher” third-personal levels, such as those corre-
sponding to various special sciences, may supervene on the lowest third-personal level.)
Call this system of levels 〈L,S〉. Then both Ω3rd and Ω1st are among the levels in
L (as may be other, higher third-personal levels). Further, a mapping of the form
σ : Ω1st  Ω3rd is among the supervenience mappings in S (as may be other superve-
nience mappings with higher levels as their targets). But now consider a different system
of levels, to be called 〈L′,S ′〉, which is just like 〈L,S〉, except that the level Ω1st and all
supervenience mappings with source-level Ω1st (such as σ : Ω1st  Ω3rd) are removed.
Clearly, 〈L′,S ′〉 is a subsystem of 〈L,S〉 and qualifies as a perfectly coherent system
of levels. Figure 4 schematically illustrates the systems 〈L,S〉 and 〈L′,S ′〉. Crucially,
Figure 4: Two systems of levels
... ... ... ...0 1 0 1
Ω3rd Ω3rd
↑
Ω1st
〈L,S〉 〈L′,S ′〉
with respect to all levels above and including Ω3rd, 〈L′,S ′〉 is indistinguishable from
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〈L,S〉. The two systems differ only with respect to the lowest level: while 〈L,S〉 has a
first-personal level at the bottom, 〈L′,S ′〉 does not.64 I believe that 〈L′,S ′〉 represents
the zombie scenario and illustrates its coherence.
Finally, my analysis suggests that it is not really meaningful to speak of “a world in
which there are zombies”, if by “world” we mean “third-personal world”. Whether or
not there are zombies depends, not on the features of any particular world in Ω3rd, but
rather on whether the third-personal worlds in Ω3rd are underwritten, or realized, by
first-personal worlds in Ω1st. By definition, no features of a third-personal world could
allow us to distinguish between zombies and non-zombies. Indeed, the third-personal
worlds in the system 〈L′,S ′〉 are indistinguishable from those in the system 〈L,S〉. On
the other hand, once we step inside any first-personal world, there is, by definition, a
subject in that world: a first-personal world is a world with a subjective perspective.
So, no properties of a first-personal world could mark the distinction between zombies
and non-zombies either. For this reason, the debate about zombies is best interpreted as
a debate about which levels are available, not as a debate about what properties there
are in a given level-specific world. I conclude that the question of how first-personal
consciousness fits into a scientific worldview is really a question about the status of a
particular level: the first-personal one.
5 Concluding remarks
I have given an abstract definition of a system of levels, inspired by ideas from cat-
egory theory, and I have discussed several applications of this definition, which show
that the proposed framework can capture notions such as levels of description, levels of
explanation, and ontological levels. I have further suggested that the framework can be
helpfully brought to bear on some familiar philosophical questions, ranging from ques-
tions about the existence of a fundamental level, the defensibility of physicalism, and the
(ir)reducibility of higher-level descriptions to questions about the relationship between
normative and non-normative domains and between first-personal and third-personal
phenomena. Since references to “levels” are ubiquitous in science and philosophy, I
hope that, by going beyond metaphorical invocations of this idea and offering a precise
formalization, the present framework will have further useful applications.
64There is a theoretical possibility of embedding 〈L,S〉 in an even richer system of levels in which the
first-personal level supervenes on some even lower level, but I do not explore this possibility here.
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